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"BANK NIGHT" GOES TO COURT
By JAMES F. THORNBURG*

Although schemes of chance were probably a by-product
of Adam and, in the opinion of some, vice versa, memory
recalls that the modern lottery of a century since was discreetly and peculiarly an instrument of fraternity, church,
and school.' The current era of the.lottery does not enjoy
such discreet limitations or salutary devotees. As a commercial stimulant, it presently affords a merchandising program for the metropolitan theatre, the neighborhood grocer,
retail vendors of gasoline, wholesale bakers, and the warp
and woof of business enterprise having immediate contact
with the public. "Bank Night" and kindred formulae have
been productive of economic benefit to their proponents, a
commensurate loss to participants, and bloodless revolutions
in the legal periodicals. Indiana has been an amiable host
to the cause; it is hoped it will be tolerant of the effects.
Statutory and judicial disapproval of gaming enterprise
has endeavored to remain apace of the ingenuity of those
who sponsor the variegated schemes. A lottery is as easily
recognized by its wake as it is difficult to define in the abstract.
*Of the South Bend Bar.
1 Whitney v. State (1858), 10 Ind. 404-. "In this state the sale of all lottery
tickets is prohibited, as no lotteries are authorized by statute. Hence, tickets
in numerous of the schemes gotten up to aid schools and churches, and gift
exhibitions, being disguised lotteries, are illegal articles."
The Legislature of the Indiana Territory, by an act of Sept. 17, 1807,
chartered Vincennes University and authorized a lottery to raise funds for
the institution. Despite the Constitutional proviso of 1851 forbidding the sanction of lotteries and legislation in accord therewith, the legality of the Vincennes
University lottery was sustained in Kellum v. State (1879), 66 Ind. 588. In
accord with the cases Phalen v. Va. (1850), 8 How. 163, 12 L. ed. 1030 and
Stone v. Miss. (1880), 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079, the Supreme Court of
Indiana expressly overruled the case of Kellum v. State, supra, in State v.
Woodward (1883), 89 Ind. 110, 46 Am. Rep. 160.
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Not unlike a childhood purgative piquantly blended with the
juice of the orange, it is better known by its results than its
ingredients. Notwithstanding. the restrictions inherent to
definition, the Courts uniformly have defined and delimited
the judicial concept of a lottery to a species of gaming 2 which
incorporates three concurrent elements, viz.:
1. A prize or thing of value proffered;
2. To one or more recipients among those participating,
the recipients to be determined through chance or caprice;
.3. A consideration having been exacted and/or received
for the privilege of participation.3
Opinion is rife as to whether lotteries are illegal per se
under common-law dogma. Mr. Williston 4 and the American
Law Institute 5 reason that lotteries are mala in se as a species
of 'gaming contract. Although no Indiana decision has been
found which antedates our criminal statutes, the civil actions
involving lottery schemes have furnished ample judicial expression in condemnation thereof as offending public policy. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States has exhibited a
contrary opinion with "They are not, in the legal acceptation
2 "There may be gaming which is not by lot, but in every prohibited lottery
there is an element of gambling." Loiseau v. State, 114 Ala. 34, 22 S. 138.
"Every lottery has the characteristics of a wager or bet, although every
wager is not a lottery." Wilkinson v. Gill, 74 N. Y. 63, 30 Am. R. 264. For
accumulated definitions see: Yellow-Stone Kit v. State (1890), 88 Ala. 196, 7
L. R. A. 599, 7 S. 338.
8 Hudelson v. State (1883), 94 Ind. 426; Lynch v. Rosenthal (1895), 144
Ind. 86, 42 N. E. 1103; Utz v. Wolf (1920), 72 Ind. App. 572, 126 N. E. 327;
R. J. Williams Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber of Commerce (1927), 147
Miss. 649, 112 S. 579; Glover v. Malloska (1927), 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W.
107; State v. Danz (1926), - Wash. -, 250 Pac. 37; State v. Mumford
(1881), 73 Mo.647, 39 Am. R. 532; State v. Wilson (1938), - Vt. -, 196 A.
757; Horner v. United States (1893), 147 U. S. 449, 37 L. ed. 237.
See also: Burns' Ind. Stats. 1933, Sec. 10-2301. Ordinarily the lottery may
be distinguished from the common forms of wager in that the undertakings
of the former are not aleatory.
4 Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 1665.
5 Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 520, Comment b.
6 Swain v. Bussel et al. (1858), 10 Ind. 438; Riggs v. Adams (1859), 12
Ind. 199; Rothrock v. Perkinson (1878), 61 Ind. 39; Lynch v. Rosenthal (1896),
144 Ind. 86, 42 N. E. 1103, 31 L. R. A. 835; Utz v. Wolf (1920), 72 Ind. App.
572, 126 N. E. 327.
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of the term, mala in se, . . . but may properly be made
mala prohibita." 7 However, the Supreme Court has not
extended advocates of the lottery the comfort. of soft words:

I

"Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and
places, but the latter infests the whole community: it enters every
dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon
the hard earnings of the
8
poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple."
The source of illegality, however, is a matter of academic
import only, as the several commonwealths and the federal
government have employed legislative mandate to outlaw the
lottery. 9

Indiana's initial Constitution of 1816 included no provision dealing with this proposition.10 Clause 8 of Article 15,
the Constitution of 1851, reading as follows: "No lottery
shall be authorized; nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be
allowed" has been construed to be self-executing. 1 1 Such interpretation of this proviso automatically announces the public
policy of the State. Statutory denial of the lottery in 183212
adumbrated the Constitutional denouncement. It is believed
that since the latter date Indiana statutes have offered no
7
8

Stone v. Miss. (1880), 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079.

Phalen v. Va. (1850), 8 How. 163, 12 L. ed. 1030.
9 See: U. S. C. A. Title 15, Sec. 45. The Federal Trade Commission,
through remedial cease and desist orders, have forbid the use of lottery merchandising programs in interstate commerce as an unfair trade practice. Chicago Silk Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 1937), 90 F. (2d) 689; Fed.
Trade Comm. v. F. A. Martoccio Co. (C. C. A. 1937), 87 Fed. (2d) 561, cert.
den. 57 S. Ct. 794; Hofeller v. Fed. Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 1936), 82 F. (2d)
647, cert. den. 299 U. S. 557; Fed. Trade Comm. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc.
(1934), 291 U. S. 304, 78 L. ed. 814. U. S. C. A. Title 18, Secs. 336 and 337
exclude lotteries and related matter from the mail. See also Title 39, Sec. 732.
Sec. 387 of Title 18 bans the lottery from interstate commerce. See also Title
19, Sec. 1305. Title 47, Sec. 316°denies advertisement to lotteries by inedium
of radio.
1OKellum v. State (1879), 66 Ind. 588.
11 State v. Woodward (1883), 89 Ind. 110.
12For a detailed history of Indiana's legislation against the lottery see:

Kellum v. State (1879), 66 Ind. 588.
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respite to the custodian of the lottery.13 Our present statutes,
invoked by the General Assembly in 1905, are as follows:
Burns, Indiana Statutes 1933.
Sect. 10-2301. "Raffling.-Whoever sets up or proposes any money,
goods, chattels or thing in action to be raffled for, or to be distributed by
lot or chance to any person who shall have paid or contracted to pay
any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such money, goods
or things in action, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than ten dollars
($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100). 14
Sect. 10-2302. Lottery-Gift enterprise.-Whoever sells a lottery
ticket or tickets, or a share or shares in any lottery scheme or gift enterprise, or acts as agent for any lottery scheme or gift enterprise, or aids
or abets any person or persons to engage in the same, or transmits money
by mail or express, 15 or otherwise transmits the same, to any lottery
scheme or gift enterprise for the division of property to be determined
by chance, or makes or draws any lottery scheme or gift enterprise for
a division of property not authorized by law, or who knowingly permits
any building, tenement, wharf-boat or other watercraft owned, leased
or controlled by him, to be used and occupied for any of the purposes
above named, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than ten dollars
($10.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
Sect. 10-2303. Lottery-Advertising-Whoever writes, prints, advertises or publishes in any way an account of any lottery, gift enterprise
or scheme of chance of any kind or description, by whatever name, style
or title the same may be denominated or known, stating when or where
the same is to be drawn, what the prizes therein or any of them are,
or the price of a ticket, or showing therein where any ticket may be
obtained, or in any way giving publicity to such lottery, gift enterprise
or scheme of chance, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than ten
dollars ($10.00) nor more than five hundred -dollars ($500)."
Although the Indiana decisions under these statutes fail
to define with exactitude a lottery or gift enterprise, consideration is obviously present in each instance. No Indiana
case has been found wherein consideration was not present.
Both sections 10-2301 and 10-2302 contemplate that consideration be exacted as an element of the public offense. The
13 See note 12, supra.
14It is to be noted that Sec. 10-2301 incorporates the three essentials of a
lottery in defining the criminal offense.

15 Quaere: Is the proviso rendering criminal the "transmission of money
by mail" to a lottery scheme in violation of the dual form of government?
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former prescribes payment or a contract to pay for the chance
as an integrant. The latter section outlaws the sale of lottery
tickets or shares in a gift enterprise. If the judiciary would
be content to construe these statutes literally it might be
argued that a monetary consideration or price must be exacted
as an element of the crime.
However, Sec. 10-2301 expressly provides that the price
exacted or contracted for may be "any valuable consideration". By the phrase, valuable consideration, the legislature
presumptively intended any exaction which the law deems
sufficient to support a simple contract. In Swain v. Bussel et al.
(1858), 10 Ind. 438, the consideration for the participation
privilege was the conveyance of real estate. The consideration requisite to a chance in the case of Hudelson v. State
16
(1883), 94 Ind. 426 was the purchase of merchandise.
Thus the favored construction enjoys at least a tacit judicial
approval.
Secs. 10-2302 and 10-2303 employ the phrase, "gift enterprise." By the use of this phrase in addition to the word,
lottery, it is of import to ascertain whether these sections
of the statute levy criminal condemnation upon a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance. It is submitted that a fair
construction of the statute does not eliminate the necessity
for consideration. Sec. 10-2302, by its terms, attacks the
sale of "a share or shares in any lottery scheme or gift enterprise". Called upon to define a gift enterprise in the Matter
of Walter J. Gregory,1 7 the Supreme Court of the United
States, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Hughes, approved a standard definition to the effect that
"a 'gift enterprise' is a scheme for the division or distribution of certain

articles of property, to be determined by chance, amongst those who have
taken shares in the scheme."
16 This case arose under a former Indiana statute, identical with the present
Sec. 10-2303. The opinion expressly states that "It makes no difference that
the ticket was to be procured by the purchase of goods." Also see in accord:
Lohman v. State (1881), 81 Ind. 15.
17 (1911), 219 U. S. 210, 55 L. ed. 184. In support of its statement the
Court cites the Indiana decision of Lohman v. State, infra note 18.
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This exact phraseology was accepted in the case of Lohman
v. State,1 8 wherein the consideration for the participation
chance was the purchase of twenty-five cents in merchandise.
Opining upon facts presenting a similar consideration, the
Court in Hudelson v. State1 9 announced:
"Whether the enterprise set out in the publication be called a scheme
of chance, a gift enterprise, or a lottery, it is still a scheme of chance,
and in that sense a lottery or gift enterprise."
If the quoted statement bears meaning it is in the inference that the terms are synonymous. The opinion of Utz v.
Wolf, 2

narrating upon like factual experience, concludes:

"We hold that the contract discloses a gift enterprise or lottery

.

.

Therefore, it appears that-the two terms relate to schemes
having common inwards, the phrase, "gift enterprise," being
descriptive of that species of lottery wherein the participation
chance is tendered with the purchase of other commodity
or service.
The first element, that is, the prize or thing of value
proffered to the public offers no avenue of evasion to the
lottery custodian. Being the sina qua non of popular appeal,
the prize is highly featured.
Skilled technicians of the lottery have sought to evade
legal prohibition by introducing a degree of skill or judgment so that the participant may be averred to act as a
rational being in the contest. The series of attempted evasions are as colorful as Christmas candies-and equally indigestible to the Courts. Only a few will be noted.
A glass globe is filled with beans and the public is invited
to adjudge the numerical quantity of its content for a nominal
stipend. Confronted by the assertion that this scheme challenged the mind to mathematical calculation, the Supreme
18 (1881),

81 Ind. 15.

19 (1883), 94 Ind. 426.
20 (1920), 72 Ind. App. 572, 126 N. E. 327.
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Court of Indiana in Hudelson v. State2 1 countered that
speculation was predominant.
Pin ball games and machines employing toy qranes in a
"catch as catch can" game are under the partial control of the
customer and, in some instances, a fair degree of proficiency
is obtained. Where both skill and chance are extant, the
prevailing rule is "that if the element of chance rather than
that of skill predominates, the game may be found to be a
lottery." 22 Upon like premise, a cartoon series entitled
"Famous Names" was banned by the Supreme Court of Mis.
souri. 23 The participants in that scheme endeavored to allo.
cate from among several listed names'the correct name 'suggested by the cartoon. Certain of the cartoons were equally
applicable to more than one of the listed titles.
"Bank night" and allied schemes have sought to salvage
the lottery through a plea of no consideration. Obviously
elements one and two of the lottery are indigenous to all
schemes of which "bank night" is representative. It is upon
the element of consideration that a sharp cleavage of opinion
arises among the cases.
"Bank night" as originally conceived required of the winning participant registration and appearance at the drawing
in the theatre within a specified time limit. The usual and
customary price of admission was exacted. It was urged
that the pgrticipation privilege was in fact gratuitous since
no additional admission price was required.
The case of Utz v. Wolf2 5 held that where consideration
is given for a thing of value and a "participation chance" is
included the consideration is entire, and thus the scheme suffers
statutory disapproval as a "gift enterprise". This premise
is not countered by the fact that the price paid for the com94 Ind. 426.
Commonwealth v. Plissner (1936), Mass., 4 N. E. (2d) 241.
23 State v. Globe Democrat Publishing Co. (1937), 110 S. W. (2d) 705.
24 Our investigation has failed to reveal any decision from the appellate
courts of Indiana upon the legality of "bank night" or a game of chance involving parallel facts.
25 (1920), 72 Ind. App. 572, 126 N. E. 327.
21 (1883),

22
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modity or service remains static. Ostensibly a prize distributed by chance under such circumstances is a gift. However, the Courts indulge a realistic presumption that the costs
of the participation scheme are actually paid by the participants as an entity. The costs are absorbed in the profit
differential created by the participants. When this presumption is essayed, it is patent that the consideration paid is
entire, that is to say, the consideration purchases the service
or product plus the participation chance.- Consideration being
26
found the scheme is in violation of the statute.
Thwarted by the theory of entire consideration, proponents
of "bank night" introduced an indifferent distribution of the
participation chances among purchasers and non-purchasers.
Free registration and appearance at the drawing within a
prescribed time limit became the exclusive requisites to recovery by the winning participant. Certain of the decisions
answered ingenuity with more of emotional piety than reason. 27 Their response, in substance, was that such schemes
offend the spirit of right living and are inimical to public
policy. Without questioning the justification of their moral
resolution, the premise scarcely answers a plea of no consideration. The supposed logical conclusion of these decisions
28
become illogical delusion in the case of Grimes v. State.
Yet, "upon occasion even Homer nods."
A respectable quantum of authority has exploited the indirect benefit theory of consideration to hold "bank night"
26U. S. v. W~allis (1893), 58 F. 942; State v. Mumford (1881), 73 Mo. 647,
39 Am. R. 532; Hudelson et al. v. State (1883), 94 Ind. 426; Lynch v. Rosen-,
thai (1895), 144 Ind. 86, 42 N. E. 1103; Lohman v. State (1881), 81 Ind. 15;
People v. Miller (1936), 2 N. E. (2d) 38, 271 N. Y. 44; Commonwealth v.
Wall (1936), Mass., 3 N. E. (2d) 28; Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly (1937),
366 Ill. 258, 8 N. E. (2d) 648; Featherstone v. Independent Service Station
Assn. (Texas), 10 S. W. (2d) 124; State v. Danz (1926), Wash., 250 Pac. 37;
Blair v. Lowham (1929), 73 Utah 599, 276 P. 292; Chamber of Commerce v.
Kieck (1934), 128 Neb. 13, 257 N. W. 493- Contra: R. J. Williams Furniture
Co. v. McComb Chamber of Commerce (1927), 147 Miss. 649, 112 So. 579.
27 Glover v. Malloska (1927), 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107; Shancell v.
Lewis Amusement Co. (La.), 171 So. 426; Grimes v. State (1937), Ala. App.,
178 So. 69; City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co. (Tex.), 100 S. W.
(2d) 695.
28 (1937), Ala. App., 178 So. 69.
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a lottery.29 Rationalized upon the premise that attendance
is increased and incidental economic benefits are derived, this
class of decisions, when carried to fruition, condemns every
form of chance enterprise-though the only accrued benefits
are those of advertisement and good will.
Other among the decisions denounce the indirect benefit
theory in that it raises incidental benefits to the status of
consideration whereas, under the better reasoned cases, inci-

dental benefits will not support a simple contract.

Further-

more the incidental benefits are not bargained for and given
in exchange of the, promise of the lottery custodian. These
cases, however, are productive of a like result in holding
that the scheme is a lottery if any of the participants tender
consideration. 0
"A game does not cease to be a lottery because some, or even many
of the players are admitted to play free, so long as others continue to
pay for their chances."'

With strict adherence to the preferred legal detriment
theory of consideration, the Supreme Court of Vermont in
the recent adjudication, State v. Wilson,3 declared "bank
night" to be illegal. Tacitly construing the contract as
unilateral (that is, a promise for an act), the Court depicts
consideration in the very acts of registration and appearance
within the prescribed time limit. Thereby the promiseeparticipant foregoes the exercise of his legal privileges to
refrain from registering and from appearing at the theatre
29 State v. Fox Kansas Theater Co. (Kan.), 62 P. (2d) 929; Sprout-Temple
Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprises, 276 Mich. 127, 287 N. W.
602; United-Detroit Theatres Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprises, Inc.
(1937), 280 Mich. 425, 273 N. W. 756; Society Theatre v. Seattle (Wash.), 203
Pac. 21; Maughs v. Porter (1927), 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242; State v. FoxBeatrice Theatre Corp. (1937), Neb., 275 N. W. 605; Barker v. State (1937),
Ga., 193 S. E. 605.
30 Commonwealth v. Wall (1936), Mass., 3 N. E. (2d) 28; Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly (1937), Ill., 8 N. E. (2d) 648; Jorman v. State (Ga.), 188
S. E. 925.
31 Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Assn. (Texas), 10 S. W.
(2d) 124-.
32 (1938), 196 A. 757.
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within the time allotment. The reasoning of the opinion is
in conformity with the general law of contracts3 3 and it is
submitted that the opinion will frequently be approved-by
astute theorists.
Those cases which sustain the legality of "bank night"
as cautiously set up with an indifferent distribution of chances
34
do so upon the basis that consideration is not exacted.
Even these decisions display a prompt caution toward any
scheme in which consideration is exacted under a deceptive
85
screen.
A quantitative analysis reveals that eight states have held
bank night legal under the particular facts presented, namely,
New York, Tennessee, California, New Hampshire, Iowa,.
Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Mexico. The Courts of
thirteen states have outlawed such s~hemes on one or another theory. They are Kansas, Michigan, Massachusetts,
Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia, Alabama, Vermont, Nebraska, Washington, Virginia, and Utah. England has furnished two pointed decisions against a kindred scheme to
increase newspaper circulation. 0 At least four federal decisions" have indicated their antipathy while there is dictum
33 Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1 (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 102; Restat. of Contracts,
Sec. 75; Cates v. Seagraves (1914),

56 Ind. App. 486, 105 N. E. 594.

84 State v. Stern (1937), Minn., 275 N. W. 626. (Three justices dissenting); People v. Shafer (1936), N. Y., 6 N. E. (2d) 410; Simmons v. Randforce
Amusement Corp., (N. Y. Mun. Ct.), 283 N. Y. S. 745; State v. Crescent
Amusement Co. (Tenn.), 95 S. W. (2d) 310;, State v. Eames, 87 N. H. 477,
183 N. E. 590; People v. Cardas (1933), 137 Cal. App. 768, 28 P. (2d) 99;

State v. Hundling (1936), (Iowa), 264 N. W. 608. The Federal Dist. Ct. for
the Southern District of Iowa reached a contrary result in Central States
Theatre Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Sup. 566; Yellow-Stone Kit v. State (1890),
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Ala. 196, 7 So. 338; Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber (C. C. A. 1st Cir.), (1936),
86 F. (2d) 958; City of Roswell v. Jones (N. M.), 67 P. (2d) 286.
35 State v. Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 A. 590.
36
Kerslake v. Knight (1925), 41 Times L. R. 555; Willis v. Young (1906),
96 L. T. N. S. 155. For complete discussion see: Hensley, "The legality of

Theatre Bank Nights," 1 Am. Lawyer (Sept., 1937)

5 ff.

37 U. S. v. Wallis (1893), 58 F. 942; Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz

(1935; D. C.), 11 F. Supp. 566; Gen. Theatres v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Co. (1935; D. C.), 9 F. Supp. 546; Affiliated Enterprises v. Gantz
(1936), 86 F. (2d) 597.
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in one case to the contrary.a8 Of interest is the fact that,
according to our investigation, eight decisions have been
rendered since January 1, 1937, seven having outlawed "bank
night".
From its strictly legal aspect the problem obviously is
visited by divergent judicial opinion. It is futile, of course,
to predict whether "bank night" schemes will continue to
enjoy a comfortable retreat in Indiana. However, where
gaming schemes fall within the spirit of a prohibitory statute
there is a strong judicial inclination to press these schemes
within the ambit of its letter.
For those who have endured (as the price of domestic
tranquillity) two comics, a news reel, and double features
including the "Birth of A Natiofi" (which, like infant industry, never grows up-just old)-all in anticipation of the
"bank night" drawing-know well enough that the lottery
laws should expand to protect the human personality from
ennui.
38 Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber (1936),

86 F. (2d) 958.

